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13 ABSTRACT   
14 Background  Few  prospec ve  studies  of  SARS-CoV-2  transmission  within  households  have  been  reported  from  the  
15 United  States,  where  COVID-19  cases  are  the  highest  in  the  world  and  the  pandemic  has  had  dispropor onate  
16 impact  on  communi es  of  color.  
17 Methods  and  Findings  This  is  a  prospec ve  observa onal  study.  Between  April-October  2020,  the  UNC  CO-HOST  
18 study  enrolled  102  COVID-posi ve  persons  and  213  of  their  household  members  across  the  Piedmont  region  of  
19 North  Carolina,  including  45%  who  iden fied  as  Hispanic/La nx  or  non-white.  Households  were  enrolled  a  median  
20 of  6  days  from  onset  of  symptoms  in  the  index  case.  Secondary  cases  within  the  household  were  detected  either  by  
21 PCR  of  a  nasopharyngeal  (NP)  swab  on  study  day  1  and  weekly  nasal  swabs  (days  7,  14,  21)  therea er,  or  based  on  
22 seroconversion  by  day  28.  A er  excluding  household  contacts  exposed  at  the  same   me  as  the  index  case,  the  
23 secondary  a ack  rate  (SAR)  among  suscep ble  household  contacts  was  60%  (106/176,  95%  CI  53%-67%).  The  
24 majority  of  secondary  cases  were  already  infected  at  study  enrollment  (73/106),  while  33  were  observed  during  
25 study  follow-up.  Despite  the  poten al  for  con nuous  exposure  and  sequen al  transmission  over   me,  93%  (84/90,  
26 95%  CI  86%-97%)  of  PCR-posi ve  secondary  cases  were  detected  within  14  days  of  symptom  onset  in  the  index  
27 case,  while  83%  were  detected  within  10  days.  I ndex  cases  with  high  NP  viral  load  (>10^6  viral  copies/ul)  at  
28 enrollment  were  more  likely  to  transmit  virus  to  household  contacts  during  the  study  ( OR  4.9,  95%  CI  1.3-18  
29 p=0.02 ).  Furthermore,  NP  viral  load  was  correlated  within  families  (ICC=0.44,  95%  CI  0.26-0.60),  meaning  persons  in  
30 the  same  household  were  more  likely  to  have  similar  viral  loads,  sugges ng  an  inoculum  effect.  High  household  
31 living  density  was  associated  with  a  higher  risk  of  secondary  household  transmission  ( OR  5.8,  95%  CI  1.3-55)  for  
32 households  with  >3  persons  occupying  <6  rooms  (SAR=91%,  95%  CI  71-98%) .  Index  cases  who  self-iden fied  as  
33 Hispanic/La nx  or  non-white  were  more  likely  to  experience  a  high  living  density  and  transmit  virus  to  a  household  
34 member,  transla ng  into  an  SAR  in  minority  households  of  70%,  versus  52%  in  white  households  ( p=0.05 ).   
35 Conclusions  SARS-CoV-2  transmits  early  and  o en  among  household  members.  Risk  for  spread  and  subsequent  
36 disease  is  elevated  in  high-inoculum  households  with  limited  living  space.  Very  high  infec on  rates  due  to  
37 household  crowding  likely  contribute  to  the  increased  incidence  of  SARS-CoV-2  infec on  and  morbidity  observed  
38 among  racial  and  ethnic  minori es  in  the  US.  Quaran ne  for  14  days  from  symptom  onset  of  the  first  case  in  the  
39 household  is  appropriate  to  prevent  onward  transmission  from  the  household.  Ul mately,  primary  preven on  
40 through  equitable  distribu on  of  effec ve  vaccines  is  of  paramount  importance.  
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41 AUTHORS  SUMMARY   
42 Why  was  this  study  done?  
43 ● Understanding  the  secondary  a ack  rate  and  the   ming  of  transmission  of  SARS-CoV-2  within  households  is  
44 important  to  determine  the  role  of  household  transmission  in  the  larger  pandemic  and  to  guide  public  
45 health  policies  about  quaran ne.  
46 ● Prospec ve  studies  looking  at  the  determinants  of  household  transmission  are  sparse,  par cularly  studies  
47 including  substan al  racial  and  ethnic  minori es  in  the  United  States  and  studies  with  adequate  follow-up  
48 to  detect  sequen al  transmission  events.  
49 ● Iden fying  individuals  at  high  risk  of  transmi ng  and  acquiring  SARS-CoV-2  will  inform  strategies  for  
50 reducing  transmission  in  the  household,  or  reducing  disease  in  those  exposed.  
51 What  did  the  researchers  do  and  find?  
52 ● Between  April-November  2020,  the  UNC  CO-HOST  study  enrolled  102  households  across  the  Piedmont  
53 region  of  North  Carolina,  including  45%  with  an  index  case  who  iden fied  as  racial  or  ethnic  minori es.   
54 ● Overall  secondary  a ack  rate  was  60%  with  two-thirds  of  cases  already  infected  at  study  enrollment.  
55 ● Despite  the  poten al  for  sequen al  transmission  in  the  household,  the  majority  of  secondary  cases  were  
56 detected  within  10  days  of  symptom  onset  of  the  index  case.   
57 ● Viral  loads  were  correlated  within  families,  sugges ng  an  inoculum  effect.   
58 ● High  viral  load  in  the  index  case  was  associated  with  a  greater  likelihood  of  household  transmission.  
59 ● Spouses/partners  of  the  COVID-posi ve  index  case  and  household  members  with  obesity  were  at  higher  risk  
60 of  becoming  infected.  
61 ● High  household  living  density  contributed  to  an  increased  risk  of  household  transmission.  
62 ● Racial/ethnic  minori es  had  an  increased  risk  of  acquiring  SARS-CoV-2  in  their  households  in  comparison  to  
63 members  of  the  majority  (white)  racial  group.  
64 What  do  these  findings  mean?  
65 ● Household  transmission  o en  occurs  quickly  a er  a  household  member  is  infected.  
66 ● High  viral  load  increases  the  risk  of  transmission.  
67 ● High  viral  load  cases  cluster  within  households  -  sugges ng  high  viral  inoculum  in  the  index  case  may  put  
68 the  whole  household  at  risk  for  more  severe  disease.  
69 ● Increased  household  density  may  promote  transmission  within  racial  and  ethnic  minority  households.   
70 ● Early  at-home  point-of-care  tes ng,  and  ul mately  vaccina on,  is  necessary  to  effec vely  decrease  
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72 INTRODUCTION   
73 Since  the  onset  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  households  have  been  a  well-recognized  se ng  for  SARS-CoV-2  
74 transmission.  Proximity  and  ven la on,  important  determinants  of  person-to-person  transmission  [1] ,  are  difficult  
75 to  control  in  shared  living  spaces.  For  those  infected  and  isola ng  at  home,  following  guidelines  to  sleep  in  a  
76 separate  bedroom,  use  a  separate  bathroom,  use  masks,  and  not  share  items  such  as  dishes,  towels,  and  bedding  
77 [2]  may  be  difficult  in  families  with  young  children  and/or  small  living  spaces;  especially  once  more  than  one  
78 household  member  is  infected.  Furthermore,  since  infec ousness  and  viral  transmission  peaks  just  before  the  onset  
79 of  symptoms  [3–5] ,  household  spread  can  occur  before  anyone  is  aware  of  a  poten al  infec on,  as  most  Americans  
80 do  not  wear  masks  at  home  or  in  what  they  define  as  their  family  bubble.  
  
81 Secondary  household  a ack  rates  reported  from  China  and  other  Asian  countries  early  in  the  pandemic  ranged  
82 from  10-15%  [6] .  This  rela vely  low  a ack  rate  is  at  odds  with  anecdotal  experience  in  the  United  States,  where  the  
83 virus  has  spread  unchecked.  While  several  meta-analyses  have  evaluated  household  transmission  rates,  all  have  
84 incorporated  both  retrospec ve  and  prospec ve  analyses.  Prospec ve  tes ng  of  household  contacts  regardless  of  
85 symptoms  status  is  required  to  es mate  the  true  secondary  a ack  rate  (SAR).  Yet  only  two  such  studies  in  the  US  
86 have  been  reported.  These  two  studies,  following  a  total  of  159  households  in  Utah,  Wisconsin,  and  Tennessee,  
87 have  started  to  paint  a  picture  of  much  higher  SARs  in  US  households  (29  and  53%)  [7,8] .  Yet,  representa on  of  
88 racial  and  ethnic  diversity  was  limited  (around  25%  of  households),  and  tes ng  was  limited  to  7  and  14  days  of  
89 follow-up,  which  may  not  capture  secondary  cases  that  result  from  sequen al  transmission  within  households.  
90 Given  the  dispropor onate  impact  of  the  COVID-19  epidemic  on  communi es  of  color,  measuring  secondary  
91 household  a ack  rates  in  vulnerable  communi es  is  important  for  shaping  preven ve  and  tes ng  strategies,  
92 modeling  spread,  targe ng  high-risk  popula ons,  and  assessing  the  length  of   me  households  should  quaran ne.   
  
93 The  UNC  CO-HOST  (COVID-19  Household  Transmission  Study)  is  the  largest  single-site  observa onal  household  
94 cohort  in  the  US  thus  far  and  the  most  ethnically  and  racially  diverse.  Covering  both  suburban  and  rural  areas  of  
95 North  Carolina,  the  study  recruited  from  a  tes ng  center  providing  results  within  24-hours  that  allowed  for   mely  
96 recruitment.  Weekly  sampling  for  quan ta ve  viral  loads  combined  with  an body  tes ng  at  one  month  provided  an  
97 extended  period  to  evaluate  transmission  rela ve  to  other  studies.  During  the   me  of  this  study,  April  to  November  
98 2020,  the  spike  protein  D614G  variant  was  already  fully  penetrant  in  North  Carolina  [9] .  The  specific  objec ve  of  
99 this  study  was  to  measure  the  secondary  a ack  rate  in  a  se ng  where  infected  individuals  were  asked  to  
100 quaran ne  at  home  and  given  standard  guidance.  Household  and  individual  demographics  as  well  as  daily  
101 symptoms  and  weekly  viral  loads  were  collected  to  iden fy  risk  factors  and   ming  of  household  transmission.   
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102 METHODS   
103 Study  Design  
104 The  CO-HOST  Study  evaluated  SARS-CoV-2  transmission  in  the  household  of  individuals  who  tested  posi ve  and  
105 quaran ned  at  home.  Here  we  describe  the  pre-planned  primary  analysis  of  the  secondary  a ack  rate  and  risk  
106 factors  associated  with  SARS-CoV-2  transmission  in  the  household  se ng  in  the  southern  United  States.  Study  
107 follow-up  started  in  April  2020  and  ended  in  November  2020.   
  
108 Ethics,  standards  and  informed  consent  
109 The  study  was  approved  by  the  Ins tu onal  Review  Board  at  the  University  of  North  Carolina  and  is  registered  at  
110 clinicaltrials.gov  (NCT04445233).  All  par cipants  (or  their  parents/guardians)  gave  wri en,  informed  consent.  
111 Minors  over  the  ages  of  7  provided  assent.   
  
112 Role  of  the  Funding  source  
113 None  
  
114 Study  se ng  
115 Index  cases  were  recruited  a er  tes ng  at  the  Respiratory  Diagnos c  Center  at  the  University  of  North  Carolina  
116 School  of  Medicine  [10] .  Par cipants  were  visited  between  3-4   mes  at  their  private  homes  using  a  mobile  unit  van  
117 and  returned  to  the  Respiratory  Diagnos c  Center  for  the  final  study  visit.  
  
118 Recruitment,  screening  and  enrollment  
119 Inclusion  criteria  for  the  index  cases  included  any  pa ent  18  years  of  age  or  older  with  a  posi ve  qualita ve  
120 nasopharyngeal  (NP)  swab  for  SARS-CoV-2  obtained  at  UNC  Hospitals,  willingness  to  self-isolate  at  home  for  a  
121 14-day  period,  willingness  to  par cipate  in  all  required  study  ac vi es  for  the  en re  28-day  dura on  of  the  study,  
122 living  with  at  least  one  household  contact  who  was  also  willing  to  consent  to  study  follow-up,  and  living  within  
123 reasonable  driving  distance  (<1  hour)  suitable  for  home  visits  by  the  study  team.  Inclusion  criteria  for  household  
124 contacts  of  index  pa ents  included  age  greater  than  1  year,  and  currently  living  in  the  same  home  as  the  index  case  
125 without  plans  to  leave  to  live  elsewhere  through  the  end  of  the  28-day  study.  
  
126 Pre-screening  was  conducted  by  telephone  when  qualifying  results  of  the  NP  swab  were  available.  During  the  
127 telephone  pre-screening,  exclusion  criteria  were  reviewed  with  the  pa ent  and  the  study  procedures  were 
128 reviewed  with  poten al  study  par cipants.  
  
129 The  overall  study  design  is  depicted  in  Figure  S1 .  A er  consen ng,  all  par cipants  were  visited  at  their  homes  on  
130 Day  1  by  a  mobile  clinical  team.  NP  and  nasal  mid-turbinate  (NMT)  swabs  were  collected  for  analysis  by  PCR  for  
131 SARS-CoV-2  and  blood  samples  were  collected  for  serology  by  both  a  rapid  an body  test  and  an  enzyme-linked  
132 immunosorbent  assay  (ELISA).  Index  cases  and  household  contacts  completed  baseline  ques onnaires  that  included  
133 basic  demographic  and  household  informa on,  abbreviated  medical  history,  symptoms,  recent  travel  history,  and  
134 exposure  to  confirmed  COVID-posi ve  cases.  All  par cipants  received  instruc on  on  how  to  perform  a  self-collected  
135 NMT  swab.  For  nasal  sampling,  par cipants  were  instructed  to  insert  the  swab  about  1-2  inches  into  one  nostril,  
136 then  swirl  5-8   mes  while  slowly  withdrawing  the  swab  and  placing  it  into  the  collec on  tube.  In  the  case  of  
137 par cipants  under  7  years  of  age,  parents  or  guardians  were  instructed  how  to  perform  the  swabbing  for  their  
138 children.  
  
139 All  par cipants  received  a  daily  symptom  ques onnaire  via  email.  Index  cases  and  COVID-posi ve  household   
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140 contacts  received  the  ques onnaire  daily  un l  no  symptoms  were  reported  for  two  consecu ve  days.  Other  
141 household  contacts  received  the  ques onnaire  daily  for  21  days  to  monitor  for  symptoms  that  might  indicate  new  
142 COVID-19  infec on.   
  
143 On  Days  7,  14  and  21,  a  study  staff  member  conducted  home  visits  for  sample  collec on  pickup.  The  staff  member  
144 le   a  nasal  swab  on  the  doorstep  for  each  par cipant  and  waited  outside  un l  everyone  had  completed  the  nasal  
145 swabs.  At  the  final  study  visit  on  Day  28  par cipants  were  asked  about  COVID-related  care-seeking  and  tes ng  and  
146 underwent  venipuncture  for  analysis  of  an -SARS-CoV-2  an bodies  by  a  rapid  an body  test  and  by  ELISA.  
  
147 All  samples  collected  during  the  study  were  placed  into  a  cooler  on  ice  immediately  a er  collec on  and  transported  
148 to  a  BSL2+  laboratory  within  2  hours.  If  a  study  par cipant  was  hospitalized  or  le   the  household  for  other  reasons,  
149 they  were  s ll  followed  un l  Day  28  to  record  outcomes,  but  sample  collec on  was  suspended.  
  
150 Laboratory  analyses  
  
151 qRT-PCR  SARS-CoV-2  viral  quan fica on  
152 Nasopharyngeal  and  nasal  swab  samples  were  tested  using  a  CDC  RT-qPCR  protocol  authorized  for  emergency  use  
153 that  consists  of  three  unique  assays:  two  targe ng  regions  of  the  virus’  nucleocapsid  gene  (N1,  N2)  and  one  
154 targe ng  human  RNase  P  gene  (RP)  (Catalog  #  2019-nCoVEUA-01,  Integrated  DNA  Technologies)  [11] .  Details  of  
155 assay  implementa on  and  calcula on  of  the  limit  of  detec on  are  described  elsewhere  [12] .  Briefly,  samples  were  
156 designated  posi ve  if  all  three  PCRs  were  posi ve  (N1  and  N2  for  virus,  RP  for  adequate  sampling).  The  viral  load  of  
157 each  sample,  in  copies/uL,  was  extrapolated  from  standard  curves  generated  for  each  viral  assay  (N1  and  N2)  using  
158 serial  dilu ons  of  the  nCoVPC  plasmid  control  (2  to  100,000  viral  RNA  copies/uL).  The  average  copies/uL  between  
159 the  N1  and  N2  assays  was  used  as  the  final  quan ta ve  viral  load.  Probit  analysis  yielded  a  limit  of  detec on  
160 (LOD)  for  the  N1  and  N2  assays  of  9  and  13  copies/uL,  respec vely.  Thus,  the  average  LOD  between  the  two  
161 assays,  11  copies/uL,  was  used  as  the  cutoff  for  sample  posi vity.  Based  on  the  sample  collec on  and  RNA  
162 extrac on  volumes  as  well  as  volume  of  template  RNA  used  in  the  RT-qPCR  (5uL),  the  reported  viral  load  represents  
163 the  number  of  viral  RNA  copies  per  5  uL  of  VTM  or  Shield  sample.  
  
164 Serology :  
165 Rapid  Test  
166 The  BioMedomics  COVID-19  IgM/IgG  Rapid  Test  is  a  point-of-care  lateral  flow  immunoassay  (LFIA)  [13,14]  that  has  
167 been  validated  as  a  research  tool  [15] .  Approximately  20  microliters  of  finger  prick  blood  was  obtained  via  a  
168 capillary  sampler  and  dispensed  on  the  sample  port  of  the  device.  Two  to  three  drops  of  buffer/developer  solu on  
169 were  applied  and  results  were  read  a er  10  minutes  by  trained  study  staff.  Posi ve,  weak  posi ve,  and  nega ve  
170 bands  for  IgM  and  IgG  were  recorded  and  a  photograph  was  stored.  A  second  reader  reviewed  the  photographs  
171 blinded  to  the  field  results  and  consensus  was  reached  on  discrepant  readings.    
  
172 Immunoassay  to  detect  an bodies  against  the  receptor  binding  domain  (RBD)  of  the  spike  protein  
173 Plasma  samples  were  heat  inac vated  at  56°C  for  30  minutes,  then  total  Ig  binding  to  the  receptor  binding  domain  
174 (RBD)  of  the  SARS-CoV-2  spike  protein  was  measured  using  a  previously  described  enzyme-linked  immunosorbent  
175 (ELISA)  assay  [16,17] .  Briefly,  bio nylated  recombinant  an gen  produced  in  mammalian  cells  consis ng  of  SARS-2  Spike  
176 RBD  is  captured  on  a  96-well  ELISA  plate  coated  with  streptavidin.  The  serum  sample  at  1:40  dilu on  is  incubated  with  
177 the  RBD-captured  wells,  and  bound  an gen  detected  using  HRP  conjugated  an -goat  total  (IgG,  IgM  and  IgA)  an body  on  
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178 a  microplate  reader.  This  in-house  ELISA  was  previously  evaluated  on  a  large  panel  of  well  characterized  samples  and  
179 shown  to  have  high  sensi vity  and  specificity  for  detec ng  SARS-CoV-2  infec on  [16,17] .  
  
180 D614G  genotyping  
181 A  real- me  PCR  assay  targe ng  a  107  bp  region  encompassing  the  D614G  muta on  in  the  SARS-CoV-2  spike  protein  
182 receptor  binding  domain  associated  with  increased  viral  load  [18]  was  designed  to  evaluate  the  prevalence  of  614G  
183 mutants  in  our  study  cohort.  5ul  of  RNA  was  reverse  transcribed  using  the  Invitrogen  SuperScript  III  First-Strand  
184 Synthesis  System  for  RT-PCR  kit  (Thermofisher  Scien fic).  2.5ul  cDNA  was  then  placed  in  22.5uL  of  qPCR  master  mix  
185 with  Roche  FastStart  Universal  Probe  Master  (ROX)  along  with  primers  and  probes  listed  in  Table  S1 .  Posi ve  control  
186 plasmids  for  mutant  (MT)  and  wild-type  (WT)  sequences  were  synthesized  by  Genewiz  (inserts  listed  in  Table  S1 )  
187 and  used  to  set  the  appropriate  Ct  threshold  for  posi vity  in  each  run.  Samples  were  considered  WT  if  detected  
188 only  by  WT  probe;  MT  if  detected  only  by  MT  probe  or  if  detected  by  both  MT  and  WT  probes  with  MT  Ct  >3  cycles  
189 lower  than  WT  Ct;  or  mixed  (containing  both  WT  and  MT  virus)  if  detected  by  both  with  Ct  difference  of  <3  cycles.   
  
190 Sample  size  determina on  
191 This  is  a  prospec ve  observa onal  study.  The  planned  target  enrollment  was  200  households.  The  study  was  
192 stopped  prior  to  reaching  this  target  due  to  funding  considera ons.  
  
193 Study  objec ves  and  outcomes  
194 The  primary  objec ve  was  to  evaluate  the  secondary  household  a ack  rate  among  household  members  of  persons  
195 quaran ned  in  their  home  a er  tes ng  posi ve  for  SARS-CoV-2.  
  
196 The  primary  study  endpoint  was  SARS-CoV-2  infec on  in  the  household  contacts  as  determined  by  real- me  PCR   of  
197 nasopharyngeal  or  nasal  swabs  for  SARS-CoV-2  at  any  of  the   mepoints  or  evidence  of  seroconversion  during  the  
198 study  based  on  an -SARS-CoV-2  an body  tes ng.   
  
199 A  secondary  objec ve  was  to  assess  individual  and  household  risk  factors  associated  with  SARS-CoV-2  transmission  
200 in  the  household.   
   
201 Data  entry,  handling,  storage  and  security  
202 A er  giving  wri en  consent,  the  par cipants  were  given  a  study  iden fica on  number,  which  was  used  in  all  future  
203 datasets  for  par cipant  anonymity.  Collected  data  were  entered  in  real- me  using  electronic  Case  Report  Forms  
204 (eCRF)  developed  on  a  REDCap  (Research  Electronic  Data  Capture)  database.  Any  data  collected  on  paper  format  
205 was  entered  by  a  study  staff  member  and  then  checked  by  the  study  coordinator.  Daily  symptom  diaries  were  
206 entered  directly  into  the  REDCap  database  by  the  par cipants  and  were  checked  by  study  staff  for  comple on  and 
207 inconsistencies.  Laboratory  related  data  were  extracted  directly  from  laboratory  equipment  and  uploaded  to  the  
208 database.  The  study  was  conducted  in  compliance  with  Good  Clinical  Prac ce.  
  
209 Sta s cal  analysis  
210 For  each  household,  if  mul ple  par cipants  were  SARS-CoV-2  posi ve  at  enrollment,  we  defined  the  index  case  as  
211 the  person  with  the  earliest  onset  of  infec on  based  on  onset  of  symptoms  and  known  date(s)  of  PCR  test  
212 posi vity.  If  this  was  ambiguous  and  to  prevent  bias,  then  baseline  an body  posi vity  was  also  used  as  evidence  of  
213 less  recent  infec on.  This  resulted  in  index  case  reassignments  in  11  households.  Any  study  par cipant  with  
214 evidence  of  prior  infec on  (an body-posi ve  with  nega ve  PCR)  at  enrollment  was  excluded  from  the  analysis  
215 (n=4).   
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216 We  summarized  demographic  characteris cs  and  underlying  condi ons  of  index  cases  and  household  contacts,  as  
217 well  as  their  household  demographics.  Baseline  characteris cs  that  are  con nuous  variables  were  dichotomized  
218 (e.g.  age,  BMI)  per  standard  conven ons.   
  
219 The  secondary  a ack  rate  (SAR)  among  household  contacts  was  calculated  as  the  propor on  of  suscep ble  
220 household  contacts  with  laboratory-confirmed  SARS-CoV-2  infec on  during  the  28-day  follow-up  period.  Household  
221 contacts  who  were  COVID-posi ve  at  enrollment  and  reported  the  same  COVID  exposure  outside  the  household  as  
222 the  index  case  were  not  considered  in  the  at-risk  popula on  as  suscep ble  contacts.  As  per  above,  secondary  cases  
223 were  defined  as  the  remaining  suscep ble  household  contacts  found  posi ve  for  SARS-CoV-2  by  PCR  tes ng  or  with  
224 evidence  of  seroconversion  during  the  study.  Household  contacts  were  excluded  from  the  SAR  analysis  if  they  
225 missed  all  follow-up  study  visits  (n=6)  or  were  symptoma c  with  nega ve  PCR  tes ng  but  missing  an body  data  at  
226 day  28  (n=1).  Among  those  included  in  the  analysis,  the  rate  of  missing  data  was  low  (<5%);  thus,  we  did  not  impute  
227 missing  data.  A  95%  CI  for  the  SAR  was  constructed  using  the  Wilson  method  for  a  single  propor on.  A  logis c  
228 regression  model  with  a  random  intercept  to  account  for  within-household  varia on  was  used  to  calculate  the  
229 race/ethnicity-specific  SAR.   
  
230 In  the  primary  SAR  analysis,  all  secondary  cases  were  presumed  due  to  household  transmission  (not  
231 community-acquired).  Sensi vity  analyses  were  performed  excluding  secondary  cases  already  infected  at  baseline  
232 or  excluding  secondary  cases  iden fied  at  day  14  or  later  that  may  have  been  acquired  outside  the  household.  The  
233 SAR  for  households  was  calculated  as  the  propor on  of  households  with  at  least  one  secondary  case  iden fied  in  
234 the  household  during  the  28-day  follow-up.   
  
235 We  es mated  the  serial  interval  (in  days)  of  symptom  onset  between  sequen al  SARS-CoV-2  infec ons  in  the  
236 household,  as  well  as  the  number  of  days  between  symptom  onset  of  the  index  case  and  PCR  posi vity  of  
237 secondary  cases  in  the  household.   
  
238 We  determined  whether  nasopharyngeal  SARS-CoV-2  viral  loads  were  correlated  within  households  (whether  
239 persons  in  the  same  household  were  more  likely  to  have  similar  NP  viral  loads)  by  the  intraclass  correla on  
240 coefficient  (ICC),  which  compares  within  versus  between  households  varia on  of  baseline  NP  viral  loads.  For  those  
241 par cipants  who  did  not  complete  an  NP  swab  on  study  day  1,  we  used  a  transformed  NMT  viral  load  to  impute  the  
242 missing  NP  value.  The  transforma on  formula  was  derived  from  a  linear  regression  equa on  generated  from  >100  
243 study  par cipants  with  posi ve  viral  load  from  both  NP  and  NMT  swabs  on  study  day  1  [12] .  To  determine  whether  
244 NP  viral  load  in  index  cases  was  associated  with  secondary  cases  in  the  same  household,  we  dichotomized  the  NP  
245 viral  load  with  a  cutoff  of  1x10^6  viral  copies/ul  and  compared  the  propor on  of  transmission  events.   
  
246 Finally,  we  examined  other  poten al  risk  factors  for  secondary  transmissions  within  the  household,  including  
247 characteris cs  of  index  cases,  household  contacts,  and  their  household  environment.  We  presented  the  odds  ra o  
248 (OR)  and  corresponding  95%  CI  for  poten al  risk  factors  using  logis c  regression  with  a  random  intercept  to  account  
249 for  within-household  correla on.  Household  contacts  were  excluded  from  the  risk  factors  analysis  if  they  missed  all  
250 follow-up  study  visits  (n=3)  unless  they  were  already  found  to  be  infected  at  enrollment  (n=3).  To  address  poten al  
251 misclassifica on,  we  excluded  household  contacts  with  nega ve  PCR  tes ng  but  missing  an body  tes ng  at  day  28  
252 (n=3).   
  
253 Sta s cal  analysis  and  prepara on  of  figures  were  conducted  using  R  4.0.2  (R  Core  Team,  Vienna,  Austria),  
254 GraphPad  Prism  (GraphPad  So ware  INC,  CA  92037,  USA ) ,  and  ArcGIS  (Esri,  Redlands,  California).  All  hypothesis  
255 tests  were  two-sided  at  a  significance  level  of  0.05  with  no  adjustment  for  mul plicity.   
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256 RESULTS    
257 Household  enrollment  
258 and  demographics  
259 Between  April  29  -  
260 October  16,  2020,  the  
261 UNC  CO-HOST  study  
262 recruited  and  enrolled  
263 102  households  all  of  
264 whom  had  at  least  one  
265 member  with  laboratory  
266 confirmed  SARS-CoV-2  
267 infec on.  Two  
268 households  were  
269 excluded  from  analysis  
270 because  all  household  
271 contacts  either  had  
272 evidence  of  prior  
273 infec on  at  baseline  
274 (an body-posi ve  with  
275 nega ve  PCR  test)  or  did  
276 not  complete  the  baseline  ques onnaire.  The  remaining  100  households  (median  size  =  3.5  persons)  were  enrolled  
277 a  median  of  6  (IQR  4-7)  days  a er  symptom  onset  of  the  designated  index  case.  These  households  spanned  34  zip  
278 codes  across  the  North  Carolina  Piedmont  Region,  North  Carolina,  USA  ( Figure  1 ).  
  
279 Among  the  100  par cipa ng  households,  the  index  case  was  reassigned  in  11  households.  Four  household  contacts  
280 were  an body-posi ve  but  PCR-nega ve  at  enrollment  (indica ng  prior  infec on)  and  thus  excluded  from  analysis.  
281 One  household  contact  without  an body  data  at  either  day  1  or  day  28  was  also  excluded.  Baseline  characteris cs  
282 for  the  remaining  100  index  cases  and  204  household  contacts  (HCs)  enrolled  in  the  study  are  shown  in  Table  1 .  
283 Among  the  100  index  cases,  48  were  male,  52  were  female,  92  were  over  18  years  of  age  and  42  reported  
284 non-white  race-ethnicity.  The  index  cases  had  a  median  viral  load  of  148,992  copies/ul  (IQR  757-2,423,155  
285 copies/ul)  at  the  first  study  visit  on  nasopharyngeal  (NP)  swab.  Among  the  204  household  contacts,  48%  were  male,  
286 52%  were  female,  66%  were  over  18  years  of  age  and  47%  reported  non-white  race-ethnicity.  Both  the  index  cases  
287 and  HCs  had  a  similar  percentage  of  adult  par cipants  with  a  Body  Mass  Index  (BMI)  over  30  kg/m 2 :  38%  of  index  
288 cases  and  32%  of  household  contacts,  consistent  with  the  prevalence  of  obesity  in  North  Carolina  (34%) [19] .  A  
289 significant  number  of  adult  index  cases  (24%)  and  household  contacts  (19%)  had  both  obesity  and  one  other  
290 co-morbidity.  Further  descrip on  of  the  underlying  condi ons  is  shown  in  Table  S2 .  Three  index  cases  and  three  
291 household  contacts  (all  from  different  households)  also  enrolled  in  a  treatment  study  in  which  they  were  
292 randomized  to  receive  either  the  oral  drug  EIDD-2801  (molnupiravir)  or  placebo  (NCT04405570).   
   
293 Household  demographics  are  shown  in  Table  S3 .  27%  of  par cipa ng  households  were  limited  to  two  members,  
294 while  28%  of  households  had  5  or  more  members.  63%  were  owner  occupied  single  family  homes  and  42%  lived  in  
295 homes  greater  than  2,000  square  feet.  Households  with  a  non-white  index  case  were  larger  (median  household  size  
296 4  versus  3,  p=0.02)  and  also  more  likely  to  live  in  a  home  <2,000  square  feet  (76%  versus  43%,  p=0.003)  compared  
297 to  households  with  a  white  index  case.  This  led  to  a  higher  “living  density”  for  non-white  households:  41%  had  >3  
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298 household  members  living  in  a  home  with   fewer  than  6  rooms,  compared  to  10%  of  white  households  (p<0.001).  In 



































300 Secondary  a ack  rate  among  household  contacts  
301 The  overall  secondary  a ack  rate  (SAR)  among  suscep ble  household  contacts  was  60%  (106/176,  95%  CI  53%-67%)  
302 ( Figure  2 ).   Of  100  households  with  304  study  par cipants  (100  index  cases  and  204  HCs)  included  in  the  analysis,  
303 99  households  completed  one  month  follow-up.  One  household  of  6  withdrew  shortly  a er  enrollment.  No  
304 households  were  lost  to  follow-up.  Twenty-two  of  the  household  contacts  tested  posi ve  at  baseline  for  
305 SARS-CoV-2,  but  were  judged  to  have  had  the  same  environmental  exposure  to  SARS-CoV-2  as  the  index  cases  (for  
306 example,  both  a ended  a  cookout  or  other  gathering  where  mul ple  individuals  later  tested  COVID-posi ve).  These  
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307 contacts  were  considered  to  have  a  common  exposure  with  the  index  case  and  were  excluded  from  the  
308 transmission  analysis,  leaving  176  suscep ble  HCs.  
  
309 Secondary  transmission  cases  were  defined  as  household  members  who  either  tested  posi ve  for  SARS-CoV-2  
310 either  by  PCR  or  had  evidence  of  seroconversion  by  day  28.  Among  the  176  suscep ble  household  contacts,  73  
311 were  posi ve  for  SARS-CoV-2  at  baseline  (plus  3  that  dropped  out)  and  were  classified  as  secondary  cases.  33  
312 addi onal  secondary  cases  were  observed  during  the  study  follow-up.  Thus,  42%  of  HCs  were  already  infected  at  
313 the   me  of  study  enrollment,  while  the  cumula ve  SAR  was  60%  ( 106/176,  95%  CI  53%-67%).  Among  those  
314 infected  at  enrollment,  90%  (64/71)  reported  having  symptoms  within  the  previous  week,  with  a  median  dura on  
315 of  5  days  of  symptoms  at  the   me  of  enrollment.   
  
316 Of  the  33  secondary  transmission  cases  that  were  observed  during  the  study,  25  were  iden fied  by  PCR  tes ng  and  
317 8  were  detected  only  because  they  seroconverted  and  were  an body  posi ve  at  the  day  28  visit.  The  majority  
318 (n=21)  occurred  in  the  first  week  a er  enrollment.  Of  the  5  cases  detected  by  PCR  a er  the  first  week  of  
319 enrollment,  4  occurred  in  households  of  5  or  more,  including  2  from  the  same  household.  Of  the  33  secondary  
320 cases  among  household  contacts  who  became  infected  with  SARS-CoV-2  during  the  study,  27  (82%)  experienced  
321 symptoms  while  6  (18%)  remained  asymptoma c. 
  
322 If  restric ng  the  SAR  to  a  more  conserva ve  defini on  of  only  those  secondary  cases  that  were  observed  during  the  
323 study  (i.e.  those  who  tested  nega ve  at  baseline),  the  observed  SAR  was  32%  (33/103).  If  removing  late  secondary  
324 cases  that  were  iden fied  at  study  day  14  or  later,  considering  that  these  may  have  been  acquired  via  later  
325 community  exposure  rather  than  household  transmission,  the  early  SAR  ranged  between  53-57%  (depending  on 
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327 At  the  household  level,  assessing  whether  any  secondary  cases  occurred  within  the  household,  SAR  was  even  
328 higher  and  skewed  towards  early  transmission  ( Figure  3 ).  Fi y  three  percent  of  suscep ble  households  (49/92) 
329 contained  at  least  one  infected  household  member  at  enrollment  besides  the  primary  index  case,  rising  to  70%  





















331 Timing  of  secondary  cases  within  the  household  
332 The  serial  interval  for  secondary  cases  in  the  household,  based  on  onset  of  symptoms  was  a  median  of  3  days  (IQR  
333 1-6  days)  a er  symptom  onset  in  the  index  case  and  2  days  (IQR  1-4  days)  from  the  most  recent  symptoma c  case  
334 in  the  household.  Because  over  two-thirds  of  secondary  household  cases  (73/106  or  69%)  were  already  infected  at  
335 enrollment  and  28%  of  households  had  mul ple  secondary  cases,  we  regard  these  as  imprecise  es mates.   
  
336 However,  understanding  when  secondary  cases  became  PCR-posi ve  in  rela on  to  onset  of  symptoms  in  the  index  
337 or  other  preceding  case(s)  is  useful  for  informing  guidelines  for  dura on  of  quaran ne  [20] .  Of  the  89  PCR+  
338 secondary  cases  for  which  the  index  case  reported  symptom  dura on,  84%  (75/89)  tested  PCR-posi ve  within  10  
339 days  of  illness  onset  in  the  index  case,  while  94%  (84/89)  tested  PCR-posi ve  within  14  days.  When  also  taking  into  
340 account  other  subsequently  infected  household  members  besides  the  index  case,  93%  (83/89)  of  secondary  cases  
341 tested  PCR+  within  10  days  of  reported  symptom  onset  of  the  most  recent  case  in  the  same  household  while  99%  
342 (88/89)  tested  PCR-posi ve  within  14  days.  Thus,  “rese ng  the  clock”  on  a  14-day  quaran ne  period  based  on  
343 subsequent  COVID+  cases  in  the  household  would  have  achieved  incremental  benefit,  isola ng  4  more  cases  during  
344 the  extended  quaran ne  period.  One  of  these  was  an  asymptoma c  infec on  with  low  viral  load  (402  copies/ul  on  
345 NMT  swab)  found  at  study  day  14,  while  the  other  3  cases  (2  from  the  same  household)  were  symptoma c  prior  to  
346 their  PCR  diagnosis.   
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347 Viral  load  within  households  and  
348 transmission  
349 SARS-CoV-2  viral  burden  is  correlated  
350 within  households  ( Figure  4 ).  When  
351 comparing  the  baseline  
352 nasopharyngeal  viral  load  within  
353 versus  between  households,  viral  
354 burden  showed  significant  clustering  
355 within  households  (ICC=0.44,  95%  CI  
356 0.26-0.60,  p<0.001).  Differences  in  
357 viral  load  are  not  a ributable  to  
358 D614G  muta on  in  the  viral  spike  
359 protein  that  has  been  associated  with  
360 increased  viral  load  and  infec vity  
361 [18] ,  as  the  vast  majority  of  isolates  
362 genotyped  contained  the  muta on.  
363 Of  92  COVID-posi ve  isolates  (index  
364 cases  and  HCs)  that  were  successfully  
365 genotyped  from  the  first  90  
366 households,  90/92  (98%)  contained  
367 the  614G  mutant,  while  only  2  were  
368 wild-type  at  this  locus.   
  
369 Addi onally,  index  cases  with  a  high  
370 NP  viral  load  (>10^6  viral  copies/ul)  at  
371 study  enrollment  were  more  likely  to  
372 transmit  virus  to  their  household  contacts  during  the  study  ( OR  4.9,  95%  CI  1.3-18  p=0.02 ).  The  median  NP  viral  load  among  index  cases  was  1.4  log 10   
373 higher  in  households  with  new  secondary  cases  detected  during  the  study  versus  those  with  no  transmission  in  the  household  ( Figure  5 ).  This  difference  
374 was  even  greater  when  restric ng  the  analysis  to  index  cases  who  were  not  already  an body-posi ve,  and  thus  more  recently  infected  [15,16] .  This  
375 associa on  of  index  viral  burden  and  transmission  did  not  extend  to  secondary  cases  that  were  already  present  at  study  enrollment,  likely  due  to   a  failure  
376 to  capture  the  peak  viral  load  of  the  index  case  in  these  households.  Other  characteris cs  of  COVID  disease  status  of  the  index  case  -  including  dura on  of  
377 symptoms  and  symptom  severity  -  were  not  associated  with  secondary  transmission  in  the  household  ( Table  2 ).  However,  the  4  index  cases  that  were  
378 hospitalized  transmi ed  within  the  household  before  hospitaliza on.   
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379 Other  risk  factors  for  household  
380 transmission  
381 Non-white  index  cases  were  more  likely  
382 to  transmit  virus  within  their  household  
383 ( Table  2 ),  despite  there  being  no  
384 difference  in  viral  loads  by  race/ethnicity  
385 (data  not  shown).  This  translates  to  a  
386 SAR  of  70%  (95%  CI  59%-79%)  in  
387 households  where  the  index  case  was  
388 non-white  or  Hispanic  compared  to  52%  
389 (95%  CI  42%-62%)  in  white  households  
390 ( Table  3 ).  Among  other  factors,  this  is 
391 likely  a ributable  to  household  
392 crowding.  A  higher  living  density,  
393 defined  as  greater  than  3  household  
394 members  living  in  a  home  with  fewer  
395 than  6  rooms  (excluding  bathrooms  and  
396 garage),  was  associated  with  a  greater  
397 odds  of  infec on  (OR  5.9,  95%  CI  1.3-27;  
398 SAR  91%,  95%  CI  71%-98%  in  high  living  
399 density  households)  ( Table  4 ),  and  a  
400 greater  propor on  of  
401 non-white/Hispanic  households  met  this  
402 defini on  of  high  living  density  (44%,  
403 18/41)  compared  to  white  households  
404 (8%,  4/51)  (p<  0.001).  Healthcare  
405 workers  were  less  likely  to  transmit  virus 
406 within  the  household  ( OR  0.22  95%  CI  
407 0.05-0.85 )  ( Table  2 ).  
  
408 Among  suscep ble  household  contacts,  
409 partners  of  the  index  case  and  those  
410 with  a  BMI  in  the  obesity  range  were  at  
411 higher  risk  of  acquiring  infec on  (OR  
412 4.1,  95%  CI  1.3-13  and  OR  5.4,  95%  
413 CI  1.4-21,  respec vely)  ( Table  5 ).  
414 While  not  reaching  sta s cal  
415 significance,  non-white  household  
416 members  and  those  who  shared  a  
417 bedroom  with  the  index  case  
418 appeared  to  have  a  higher  risk  of  
419 infec on.  Sharing  a  bathroom  was  
420 associated  with  a  higher  risk  of  
421 secondary  infec on  during  study  follow-up  (p=0.01,  data  not  shown).  Children  of  the  index  case  had  a  lower  risk  of  
422 infec on,  but  this  did  not  reach  sta s cal  significance  ( OR  0.42,  95%  CI  0.15-1.2).  
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423 DISCUSSION   
424 Household  transmission  is  one  of  the  main  drivers  of  the  SARS-CoV-2  pandemic.  By  incorpora ng   mely  
425 recruitment  of  index  cases,  prospec ve  sampling  to  21  days  regardless  of  symptom  status,  and  diverse  
426 representa on,  we  show  that  household  transmission  occurs  in  the  majority  of  COVID-posi ve  North  Carolina  
427 households.  The  overall  secondary  a ack  rate  in  our  sample  was  60%,  rising  to  70%  in  minority  households  and  
428 91%  in  households  with  higher  living  density.  Importantly,  we  show  not  only  that  those  infected  with  a  high  viral  
429 load  are  more  likely  to  transmit  virus  to  other  members  of  the  household,  but  that  they  seed  other  high-viral  load  
430 infec ons,  pu ng  the  en re  household  at  higher  risk  for  more  severe  illness  [21] .  Spread  within  the  household  
431 happens  quickly,  o en  with  one  or  more  household  members  already  infected  by  the   me  the  first  case  in  the  
432 household  is  diagnosed.  
  
433 While  the  most  complete  meta-analysis  of  household  transmission  studies,  published  in  December  2020,  found  a  
434 much  lower  overall  household  SAR  of  16.6%  (95%  CI,  14.0%-19.3%),  it  noted  significant  heterogeneity  between  
435 studies  (ranging  4-45%)  and  combined  both  retrospec ve  studies  based  on  contact  tracing  data  and  prospec ve  
436 analyses,  with  the  former  comprising  most  of  the  studies  [6] .  As  would  be  expected,  studies  with  increased  
437 frequency  of  tes ng  regardless  of  symptom  status  generally  show  higher  infec on  rates  [22] .  In  the  US,  a  
438 retrospec ve  study  in  New  York  that  included  household  tes ng  offered  regardless  of  symptom  status  reported  a  
439 SAR  of  38%  [23] ,  while  two  more  recently  published  prospec ve  studies  following  a  total  of  159  households  in  Utah  
440 and  Wisconsin  (58  households,  SAR  29%) [7] ,  and  Tennessee  and  Wisconsin  (101  households,  SAR  53%)  [8]  also  
441 report  higher  SARs.  The  former  study  was  completed  during  a   me  of  shelter-in-place  policies.  A  retrospec ve  
442 study  of  32  households  of  pediatric  cases  that  relied  on  symptom  ascertainment,  also  during  a   me  of  
443 shelter-in-place,  found  a  SAR  of  46%  [24] .  Altogether,  these  studies  have  started  to  paint  a  picture  of  much  higher  
444 secondary  a ack  rates  within  households.   
  
445 There  are  several  likely  explana ons  for  why  the  SAR  we  report  is  the  highest  yet  among  US  studies.  Compared  to  
446 previous  studies,  this  study  had  longer  follow-up,  including  weekly  PCR  tes ng  to  21  days,  combined  with  an body  
447 tes ng  at  day  28.  Longer  follow-up  is  needed  to  capture  poten al  ter ary  cases  (from  sequen al  transmission)  in  
448 the  household.  However,  cases  iden fied  later  during  follow-up  may  also  have  been  acquired  in  the  community,  as  
449 the  study  spanned  seven  months  whilst  the  epidemic  in  North  Carolina  evolved  from  nursing  homes,  prisons,  and  
450 meatpacking  facili es;  to  frontline  workers;  to  returning  college  students;  and  finally  the  general  popula on.  We  
451 suspect  separately  community-acquired  cases  are  few  amongst  the  household  contacts  in  this  study,  but  even  
452 limi ng  our  SAR  analysis  to  secondary  cases  detected  within  the  first  week  of  enrollment,  the  a ack  rate  among  
453 household  contacts  is  s ll  >50%.  Second,  representa on  of  racial  and  ethnic  diversity  has  been  limited  in  prior  
454 studies  (>=70%  white,  non-Hispanic  in  each  of  the  three  aforemen oned  studies  [7,8,23] ).  We  found  that  risk  
455 factors  for  secondary  infec on  in  household  contacts  -  including  higher  living  density  and  obesity  -  were  more  
456 frequent  among  households  with  par cipants  who  iden fied  as  non-white  or  Hispanic,  who  comprised  45%  of  our  
457 study  sample.  Third,  although  we  excluded  22%  of  household  contacts  infected  at  baseline  due  to  report  of  a  
458 common  exposure  as  the  index  case,  this  propor on  may  in  fact  have  been  higher  due  to  poten al  recall  bias  for  
459 common  exposures.  However,  in  our  experience,  a  large  propor on  of  these  exposures  s ll  occur  among  family,  if  
460 not  the  immediate  household.  In  44%  of  households,  at  least  one  household  member  (most  o en  young  children)  
461 declined  to  par cipate,  which  may  have  biased  our  es mate  as  well.  Finally,  the  CO-HOST  study  was  conducted  
462 during  a   me  when  the  poten ally  more  infec ous  614G  variant  [25]  predominated  in  North  Carolina,  involving  
463 >95%  of  our  sample,  paralleling  its  rise  and  dominance  in  the  United  States  [18] .  Overall,  it  is  clear  that  SAR  will  vary  
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464 in  different  se ngs  and  needs  to  be  contextualized  based  on  geography,  risk  groups,  and  the  level  of  community  
465 transmission  and  public  policies  in  effect  at  the   me  of  the  study.   
466 Our  data,  with  the  majority  of  cases  occurring  within  one  week  from  illness  onset  in  the  index  case,  are  consistent  
467 with  previous  modeling  studies  indica ng  that  infec ousness  peaks  just  before  the  onset  of  symptoms  [3–5,26] .  
468 Prac cally  speaking,  this  means  that  by  the   me  the  first  case  in  the  household  is  diagnosed,  others  are  already  
469 incuba ng  virus  if  not  already  tes ng  posi ve.  This  is  especially  true  when  there  are  delays  to  tes ng  or  obtaining  
470 results,  as  was  common  in  the  first  few  months  of  the  pandemic.  Thus,  public  health  messages  to  wear  masks  and  
471 self-isolate  at  onset  of  symptoms,  while  prudent,  are  unlikely  to  eliminate  household  spread,  even  if  they  were  
472 feasible  in  all  households.  Early  and  frequent  tes ng,  combined  with  agents  for  post-exposure  prophylaxis,  would  
473 be  needed  to  substan ally  mi gate  the  impact  of  the  virus  on  families  that  have  been  inoculated  and  not  yet  
474 vaccinated  [27] .  Otherwise,  mask  wearing  within  a  household  at  all   mes  is  preferable  in  households  with  
475 unvaccinated  members  who  are  vulnerable  to  severe  COVID-19.   
  
476 The  length  of  household  quaran ne  is  o en  problema c  for  COVID-posi ve  persons  and  their  households.  Current  
477 recommenda ons  worldwide  favor  a  14-day  quaran ne  period  for  the  en re  household  if  one  member  is  infected.  
478 However,  compliance  is  difficult,  especially  for  families  with  young  children,  those  with  limited  resources,  and  those  
479 unable  to  work  from  home.  If  the  quaran ne  period  is  decreased,  the  risk  of  onward  transmission  is  increased,  but  
480 the  size  of  this  risk  remains  an  ac ve  subject  of  inves ga on  [20,27] .  One  approach  has  been  to  reset  the  
481 ‘quaran ne  clock’  for  the  en re  household  by  14  days  each   me  a  new  household  member  is  diagnosed,  but  this  
482 has  further  increased  the  burden  and  decreased  compliance.  In  this  study,  two-thirds  of  household  contacts  were  
483 already  infected  at  enrollment,  a  median  of  6  days  a er  symptom  onset  in  the  index  case.  We  found  that  94%  of  
484 secondary  cases  were  detected  within  14  days  from  symptom  onset  of  the  index  case,  and  rese ng  the  clock  on  
485 quaran ne  based  on  subsequent  cases  in  the  household  was  of  incremental  benefit  (capturing  an  addi onal  4%  of  
486 cases).  This  data  supports  the  recommenda on  of  a  single  14-day  quaran ne  for  the  en re  household.   
  
487 A  novel  finding  of  our  study  is  the  correla on  of  SARS-CoV-2  viral  burden  within  households.  Increased  viral  load  
488 increases  infec vity  in  vivo  [25] ,  and  a  recent  study  of  282  clusters  in  Spain  (many  involving  household  contacts)  
489 showed  increased  risk  of  transmission  with  shorter   me  to  onset  of  symptoms  among  contacts  as  viral  load  
490 increased  [28] .  Addi onally,  an  increasing  number  of  studies  are  confirming  that  greater  viral  burden  (high  viral  load  
491 or  lower  Ct  values  by  PCR)  is  associated  with  disease  severity  [21,29,30] .  Now  adding  a  third  piece  to  this  puzzle,  we  
492 show  that  households  seeded  with  a  high  viral  load  infec on  are  more  likely  to  have  others  with  high  viral  loads,  
493 and  therefore  increased  risk  for  severe  illness.  This  implies  that  when  a  person  is  hospitalized,  others  in  the  same  
494 household  may  be  at  an  even  higher  risk  for  a  similar  outcome  compared  to  risk  based  on  their  individual  risk  
495 factors  (age,  comorbidi es)  alone.  Anecdotally,  husbands  and  wives,  siblings,  and  adult  parents  and  children  are  not  
496 infrequently  hospitalized  in  succession,  though  the  prevalence  of  this  is  unknown.  An  inoculum  effect  may  underlie  
497 this  finding  [31]  and  also  explain  why  secondary  cases  in  households  appear  to  be  overdispersed,  with  either  most  
498 or  all  members  infected,  or  none  at  all  [6,32,33] .  Viral  load  dynamics  will  no  doubt  con nue  to  shape  household  
499 transmission  and  the  larger  pandemic,  as  newer,  poten ally  more  infec ous  variants  emerge  even  as  vaccina on  
500 decreases  the  “community  viral  load.”   
  
501 To  our  knowledge,  this  is  also  the  first  study  to  show  increased  transmission  in  non-white  US  households.  Though  
502 they  experience  similar  rates  of  case  fatality,  African  American/Black  and  Hispanic  popula ons  in  the  US  experience  
503 dispropor onately  higher  rates  of  SARS-CoV-2  infec on  and  COVID-19–related  mortality  [34] .  These  racial  
504 dispari es  are  thought  to  be  due  to  differences  in  health  care  access  and  exposure  risk  that  are  driven  by  systemic  
505 societal  inequi es  rather  than  individual  biological  or  behavioral  characteris cs  [35–38] .  The  CO-HOST  study  is  
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506 consistent  with  this  explana on.  While  the  sample  size  was  not  sufficient  to  inves gate  drivers  of  the  increased  
507 transmission  in  minority  households,  we  found  that  high  living  density/household  crowding,  which  was  more  
508 common  in  the  non-white  households,  was  associated  with  increased  transmission.  Trends  in  home  ownership,  
509 educa onal  status,  and  living  space  within  our  data  support  the  role  of  social  vulnerabili es  in  modula ng  
510 transmission  risk  within  households,  a  major  se ng  of  SARS-CoV-2  transmission.   
  
511 In  our  risk  factors  analysis,  we  found  that  spouses/partners  and  household  members  with  obesity  were  at  higher  
512 risk  of  becoming  infected,  while  households  of  healthcare  workers  were  less  likely  to  become  infected.   All  of  the  
513 index  cases  in  this  study  were  symptoma c,  hence  we  were  unable  to  assess  the  likelihood  of  transmission  from  
514 symptoma c  versus   asymptoma c  cases.  We  were  also  unable  to  detect  any  impact  of  age  or  other  comorbidi es  
515 on  acquisi on  of  infec on,  likely  due  to  the  small  effect  size  mediated  through  these  variables  and  limited  sample  
516 numbers.  However,  a  meta-analysis  has  found  that  secondary  a ack  rates  are  increased  from  symptoma c  index  
517 cases  in  comparison  to  asymptoma c  cases,  adult  index  cases  in  comparison  to  child  index  cases,  and  in  spouses  
518 compared  to  other  family  members  [6] .   
  
519 In  conclusion,  SARS-CoV-2  transmits  early  and  o en  among  household  members.  While  masking,  physical  
520 distancing,  and  quaran ning  the  whole  household  may  reduce  or  prevent  transmission  beyond  the  household,  
521 these  strategies  are  less  effec ve  and  feasible  within  the  household,  especially  in  the  se ng  of  high  viral  load  
522 infec ons  and  crowded  living  spaces.  Frequent  point-of-care  tes ng  and  prophylaxis  in  those  at-risk  for  severe  
523 illness,  and  ul mately  widespread  and  equitable  distribu on  of  vaccines,  are  needed  to  lessen  the  impact  of  
524 COVID-19  within  households  and  vulnerable  communi es.   
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